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Easy scalar decompositions
for efficient scalar multiplication
on elliptic curves and genus 2 Jacobians
Benjamin Smith
Abstract. The first step in elliptic curve scalar multiplication algo-
rithms based on scalar decompositions using efficient endomorphisms—
including Gallant–Lambert–Vanstone (GLV) and Galbraith–Lin–Scott
(GLS) multiplication, as well as higher-dimensional and higher-genus
constructions—is to produce a short basis of a certain integer lattice
involving the eigenvalues of the endomorphisms. The shorter the basis
vectors, the shorter the decomposed scalar coefficients, and the faster
the resulting scalar multiplication. Typically, knowledge of the eigenval-
ues allows us to write down a long basis, which we then reduce using the
Euclidean algorithm, Gauss reduction, LLL, or even a more specialized
algorithm.
In this work, we use elementary facts about quadratic rings to im-
mediately write down a short basis of the lattice for the GLV, GLS,
GLV+GLS, and Q-curve constructions on elliptic curves, and for genus
2 real multiplication constructions. We do not pretend that this repre-
sents a significant optimization in scalar multiplication, since the lattice
reduction step is always an offline precomputation—but it does give a
better insight into the structure of scalar decompositions. In any case,
it is always more convenient to use a ready-made short basis than it is
to compute a new one.
1. Introduction
Scalar multiplication on elliptic curves (or Jacobians of genus 2 curves) is
a key operation in many modern asymmetric cryptographic primitives. The
classic scenario is as follows: let G ⊂ A(Fq) be a cyclic subgroup of order
N , where A is an elliptic curve or an abelian surface over a finite field Fq.
Given an integer m (typically on the order of N) and a point P in G, our
goal is to compute
[m]P := P + P + · · ·+ P︸ ︷︷ ︸
m times
as quickly as possible.
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Since elliptic curve scalar multiplication is analogous to exponentiation
in finite fields, many algorithms originally developed with the multiplicative
groups of finite fields (or general abelian groups) in mind transfer directly
to scalar multiplication: square-and-multiply loops in finite fields become
double-and-add loops on elliptic curves, for example. However, the geom-
etry of elliptic curves can offer us new algorithms with no true finite field
analogues. A spectacular (and easy) example of this phenomemon is scalar
multiplication with endomorphism decompositions, originally proposed by
Gallant, Lambert, and Vanstone [10]. We present a general version of their
idea below that is flexible enough to accommodate higher-dimensional and
higher-genus constructions.
The general scalar decomposition technique. Let A, G, and N be
as above, and let φ1, . . . , φr be Fq-endomorphisms of A. We lose nothing by
supposing φ1 = 1. In contrast to [19], we do not suppose that the φi form
a linearly independent set.
Suppose that φi(G) ⊆ G for 1 ≤ i ≤ r (this is the typical situation in
cryptographic applications, where N is so close to #A(Fq) that there is no
room for the image of G to be anything but G itself); then each φi restricts
to an endomorphism of G. But G is a cyclic group, isomorphic to Z/NZ, and
as such each of its endomorphisms is multiplication by some integer (defined
moduloN). In particular, each endomorphism φi acts on G as multiplication
by an integer eigenvalue −N/2 < λφi ≤ N/2, such that
φi|G = [λφi ]G .
Definition 1. Let D be the Z-module homomorphism
D : Zφ1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Zφr −→ Z/NZ
(a1, . . . , ar) 7−→ a1λφ1 + · · · + arλφr ;
an r-dimensional1 decomposition of a scalar m is any element of D−1(m).
Returning to the scalar multiplication problem: we can compute [m]P
for any P in G by using a multiexponentiation algorithm on the points
φ1(P ), . . . , φr(P ) to compute
[m]P = [a1]φ1(P )⊕ · · · ⊕ [ar]φr(P ) for any (a1, . . . , ar) ∈ D−1(m) .
1 We emphasize that the dimension of r of a decomposition has no relation to the
dimension of A, or to the Z-rank of the endomorphism ring. Typical values for r are
r = 1, corresponding to classical scalar multiplication; r = 2, as in in Gallant–Lambert–
Vanstone [10] and Galbraith–Lin–Scott [9] multiplication; and r = 4, as proposed by
Longa and Sica [19] and Guillevic and Ionica [12]. A technique with r = 3 was proposed
by Zhou, Hu, Xu, and Song [32], but this is essentially Longa–Sica with a4 = 0. Bos,
Costello, Hisil, and Lauter have implemented a genus 2 scalar multiplication with r = 8,
but this seems to be the upper limit of practicality for these techniques [3].
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The literature on exponentation and multiexponentiation algorithms is
vast, and we will not attempt to summarize it here (but for an introduc-
tion to general exponentation and multiexponentation algorithms, we rec-
ommend [8, §2.8,§11.2] and [7, Chapter 9]). For the purposes of this article,
it suffices to note that for the scalar decomposition technique to offer an
advantage over simply computing [m]P as a conventional exponentiation,
The endomorphisms must be efficient : that is, any φi(P ) must
be computable for the cost of a few group operations, and
The decomposition must be short : that is,
‖(a1, . . . , ar)‖∞ = max
i
|ai|
should be significantly smaller than |m|, which is typically on the
order of N .
In this article, we suppose that we are given a fixed set of efficient φi,
and concentrate on the problem of computing short scalar decompositions.
First, consider the lattice of decompositions of 0:
L := kerD = 〈(z1, . . . , zr) ∈ Zr | z1λφ1 + · · ·+ zrλφr ≡ 0 (mod N)〉 .
The set of decompositions of any m in Z/NZ is then the lattice coset
D−1(m) = (m, 0, . . . , 0) + L .
To find a short decomposition of m, we can subtract a nearby vector in
L from (m, 0, . . . , 0). The reference technique for finding such a vector in L
is Babai rounding [1], which works as follows: if b1, . . . ,br is a basis for L,
then we let (α1, . . . , αr) be the (unique) solution in Q
r to the linear system
(m, 0, . . . , 0) =
r∑
i=1
αibi ,
and set
(a1, . . . , ar) := (m, 0, . . . , 0) −
r∑
i=1
⌊αi⌉bi ;
then (a1, . . . , ar) is an r-dimensional decomposition of m. Since
(a1, . . . , ar) =
r∑
i=1
(αi − ⌊αi⌉)bi
and |x− ⌊x⌉ | ≤ 1/2 for any x in Q, we have
‖(a1, . . . , ar)‖∞ ≤ r
2
max
i
‖bi‖∞ .
It is clear, therefore, that finding short decompositions depends on find-
ing a short basis for L. Note that L depends only on the φi, and not on
the eventual scalars m or points P to be multiplied; as such, the short ba-
sis can (and should) be precomputed. Assuming that the eigenvalues have
pairwise differences of absolute value at least N1/r, there exists a basis with
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maxi ‖b‖∞ in O(N1/r), which will yield scalar decompositions of bitlength
around 1r log2N .
In most of the scalar decomposition literature, a short basis of L is
produced by starting with a long basis —typically the basis
b1 = (N, 0, . . . , 0) ,
b2 = (−λφ2 , 1, 0, . . . , 0) ,
b3 = (−λφ3 , 0, 1, 0, . . . , 0) ,
...
br = (−λφr , 0, . . . , 1)
—before applying a lattice reduction algorithm to produce a short basis.
For r = 2, Gallant, Lambert, and Vanstone used the Euclidean algorithm,
which is equivalent to the usual Gauss lattice reduction algorithm (though
Kaib’s algorithm for the infinity norm [15] may give marginally better re-
sults). In higher dimensions, we would typically use a fast LLL variant
(such as fpLLL [5])—though Longa and Sica [19] went so far as to propose
a new 4-dimensional lattice basis reduction algorithm for their GLV+GLS
construction on elliptic curves.
Our contribution: ready-made short bases. Our contention in this
article is that in most cryptographic situations, no lattice basis reduction is
required to find a short basis of L: one can simply write down vectors of
length at most O(#A(Fq)1/r) from scratch. The information that allows us
to do so is typically a by-product of the group order computation (or of the
CM method). For the abelian varieties most useful in cryptography, these
vectors either form a basis for L, or can be easily modified to do so.
Galbraith, Lin, and Scott [9] and the author [26] have already con-
structed families of endomorphisms equipped with a convenient ready-made
basis; in this work, we generalize these ready-made bases to all of the other
known efficient endomorphism constructions for elliptic curves and to real
multiplication techniques for genus 2 Jacobians. In this way, we construct
explicit short bases for the Galbraith–Lin–Scott (GLS), Gallant–Lambert–
Vanstone (GLV), Guillevic–Ionica [12], Longa–Sica, and Q-curve reduction
techniques, as well as for the Kohel–Smith [17] and Takashima [28] methods
for genus 2 Jacobians.
We do not pretend that this is a significant optimization for scalar de-
composition methods: the construction of a short basis is essentially a one-
shot precomputation, and existing lattice basis reduction methods are cer-
tainly fast enough on the relevant input sizes. However, the construction of
these “instant” bases turns out to be an illuminating exercise: short bases
can be read off from they are simple endomorphism ring relations that are,
in practice, known in advance. The bottom line is that it is always more
convenient to not compute something than it is to compute it.
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2. Relations between quadratic orders
We recall some elementary facts from the theory of quadratic fields.
Further details and proofs can be found in almost any basic algebraic number
theory text (we recommend [27]).
Let K be a quadratic field, real or imaginary, with maximal order OK
and discriminant ∆K . If ξ is an element of OK then we write tξ for its trace,
nξ for its norm. If ξ is not in Z, then it generates an order Z[ξ] in OK ; we
write ∆(ξ) = t2ξ−4nξ for the discriminant of Z[ξ], and Pξ(T ) = T 2−tξT+nξ
for the minimal polynomial of ξ. The discriminants of OK and Z[ξ] are
related by ∆(ξ) = c2ξ∆K for some positive integer cξ, the conductor of Z[ξ]
in OK .
The set of orders inK form a lattice (in the combinatorial sense), indexed
by the conductor: Z[ξ] ⊂ Z[ξ′] if and only if cξ′ | cξ. If Z[ξ] ⊂ Z[ξ′] are orders
in K, then necessarily
(1) ξ = cξ′ + b
for some integers b and c. It follows that
(2) b =
1
2
(
tξ − ctξ′
)
and c2 =
∆(ξ)
∆(ξ′)
.
Note that c is, up to sign, the relative conductor of Z[ξ] in Z[ξ′]. Multiplying
Eq. (1) through by tξ′ − ξ′, which is also nξ′/ξ′, we obtain a second relation
(3) ξξ′ − tξ′ξ − bξ′ + (cnξ′ + btξ′) = 0 .
The following lemma turns the relations between endomorphisms of Eqs. (1)
and (3) into relations between eigenvalues, which we will use later to produce
short lattice vectors.
Lemma 1. Let ξ and ξ′ be endomorphisms of an abelian variety A/Fq
such that Z[ξ] and Z[ξ′] are quadratic rings and Z[ξ] ⊆ Z[ξ′], so ξ = cξ′ + b
for some integers b and c. Let G ⊂ A be a cyclic subgroup of order N such
that ξ(G) ⊆ G and ξ′(G) ⊆ G, and let λ and λ′ be the eigenvalues in Z/NZ
of ξ and ξ′ on G, respectively. Then
λ− cλ′ − b ≡ 0 (mod N) and
λλ′ − tξ′λ− bλ′ + cnξ′ + btξ′ ≡ 0 (mod N) .
Proof. This follows immediately by mapping the relations in Eqs. (1)
and (3) through the homomorphism Z[ξ′]→ End(G) ∼= Z/NZ sending ξ′ to
λ′ (mod N) (and ξ to λ (mod N)). 
3. General two-dimensional decompositions for elliptic curves
Let E/Fq be an ordinary elliptic curve. If π is the q-power Frobenius
endomorphism on E then
Pπ(T ) = T
2 − tπT + q ,
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where
|tπ| ≤ 2√q and ∆π := t2π − 4q < 0 .
Theorem 2. Let φ be a non-integer endomorphism of E such that Z[π] ⊂
Z[φ], so π = cφ + b for some integers c and b. Suppose that we are in the
situation of §1 with A = E and (φ1, φ2) = (1, φ). The vectors
b1 = (b− 1, c) and b2 = (cdeg(φ) + (b− 1)tφ, 1− b)
generate a sublattice of L of determinant #E(Fq). If G = E(Fq), then L =
〈b1,b2〉.
Proof. The Frobenius endomorphism π fixes the points in E(Fq), so
π(G) = G and the eigenvalue of π on G is λπ = 1. Applying Lemma 1 with
(ξ, ξ′) = (π, φ) and (λ, λ′) = (1, λφ), we obtain relations
(b− 1) · 1 + c · λ ≡ 0 (mod N) and
((b− 1)tφ + cnφ) · 1 + (1− b) · λ ≡ 0 (mod N) .
The first implies that b1 is in L, the second that b2 is in L. Equations (2)
imply that
det(〈b1,b2〉) = (b− 1)2 + c(cdeg(φ) + (b− 1)tφ) = q − tπ + 1 ,
which is #E(Fq). 
Theorem 2 constructs two basis vectors, but it makes no claim about
their length. We can give some almost-trivial bounds on the size of b and c,
using 4q − t2π = −c2∆(φ), b = 12 (tπ − ctφ), and the triangle inequality:
(4) |c| = 2√q
√
((tπ/2
√
q)2 − 1)/∆(φ) and |b| ≤ 1
2
|tπ|+ 1
2
|tφ||c| .
But proving general bounds that apply for arbitrary endomorphisms
is probably the wrong approach when all of the endomorphisms used in
practical scalar decompositions are special (and deliberately non-general)
constructions. Consider the Ciet–Sica–Quisquater bounds of [6, Theorem 1]
for the case r = 2 of §1: for every integer m, there exists a decomposition
(a1, a2) of m such that ‖(a1, a2)‖∞ ≤ C
√
N , with C = (1+ |tφ|+nφ)1/2. In
terms of bitlength,
(5) log2 ‖(a, b)‖∞ ≤ 12 log2N + 12 log2 (1 + |tφ|+ nφ) .
In this theorem, tφ and nφ (and C) are implicitly treated as constants—that
is, independent of N and q. While this is appropriate for GLV curves, tφ
and nφ are not “constant” when φ is inseparable (notably, nφ is divisible by
p). In this case, the bound above is spectacularly loose: Remark 3 below
gives a detailed example of this in the context of GLS endomorphisms.
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4. Shrinking the basis (or expanding the sublattice) to fit G
Let h be the cofactor such that #E(Fq) = hN . By the Pohlig–Hellman–
Silver reduction [23], the cryptographic strength of E depends entirely on
the size of the prime N , so we should choose E with N as large as possible.
While h = 1 is ideal, allowing h = 2 or 4 permits faster curve arithmetic
via transformations to Montgomery [22] or twisted Edwards [14] models,
for example. (In the pairing-based context h may be somewhat larger.)
The lattice L has determinant N , but the vectors b1,b2 constructed by
Theorem 2 are a basis for a (sub)lattice of determinant hN . If h 6= 1, then
while our sublattice will still give short decompositions, it is suboptimal. If
h = 4, for example, then our basis may be one bit too long—which generally
means one double too many when the resulting decompositions are used in
a multiexponentiation algorithm.
If for some reason G 6= E(Fq), then we want to be able to derive a basis
of the full lattice L from b1,b2. First, note that〈
1
gb1 ,
1
gb2
〉
⊆ L where g = gcd(c, b− 1) ,
because the relations (b − 1) + cλ ≡ 0 (mod N) and cdeg(φ) + (b − 1)tφ +
(b − 1)λ ≡ 0 (mod N) still hold when we divide through by g. This new
sublattice has index #E(Fq)/(g2N) in L. Note that if g 6= 1, then E [g] ⊂
E(Fq), because π − 1 = g((c/g)φ + (b− 1)/g), so π − 1 factors through [g].
More generally, suppose ℓ is a prime dividing h: then there exists a
sublattice L′ such that
〈b1,b2〉 ⊂ L′ ⊆ L with [L′ : 〈b1,b2〉] = ℓ .
Looking at the components of b1 and b2, we see that if ℓ divides c, then it
must also divide b− 1 (otherwise L′ cannot exist),2 and we can replace each
bi with
1
ℓbi as above to produce a sublattice of index h/ℓ
2 in L.
Suppose now that ℓ does not divide c. If ℓ divides b− 1 and deg φ, then
1
ℓb2 is in L, so we can take L′ =
〈
b1,
1
ℓb2
〉
. Otherwise, 1ℓ (b1 + ibj) is in L
for precisely one 0 < i < ℓ: that is, i = −c(b−1)−1 mod ℓ. We can therefore
take L′ = 〈b1, 1ℓ (b1 + ib2)〉.
Iterating this process factor by factor of h, we can gradually shrink the
vectors produced by Theorem 2 to derive a true basis of L. But as we
remarked above, in conventional discrete-log based cryptography the most
important cases are h = 1, 2, and 4, and then there is almost nothing to
be done. To handle the cases where E(Fq) ∼= G ⊕ Z/2Z or G ⊕ (Z/2Z)2, for
example, the following simple procedure produces a basis for L:
• If c is even, then L = 〈12b1, 12b2〉.
2 It is possible to take a much more highbrow view of all this: Theorem 1 of [18]
implies that if E [ℓ] ⊆ E(Fq) then ℓ must divide the conductor of Z[π] in the endomorphism
ring of E (see also [16, p. 40]). In this case ℓ divides both π−1 and cφ, so it must also divide
b− 1. Removing the factor of ℓ2 from the index of our sublattice therefore corresponds to
removing the contribution of the full ℓ-torsion to our endomorphism relations.
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• If c and b are odd and degφ is even, then L = 〈b1, 12b2〉.
• Otherwise, L = 〈b1, 12(b1 + b2)〉.
5. Decompositions for GLV endomorphisms
Let E˜ be an elliptic curve over Q with complex multiplication by Z[√∆];
that is, with an explicit endomorphism φ˜ such that Z[φ˜] ∼= Z[
√
∆]. Let
E/Fq be the (good) reduction modulo p of E , (and suppose that E is not
supersingular); by definition, E comes equipped with an explicit separable
endomorphism φ such that Z[φ] ∼= Z[
√
∆]. If ∆ and E˜ were was chosen in
such a way that φ has very low degree, then φ can be efficiently computable,
and hence useful for scalar decompositions.
Suppose, therefore, that φ has very low degree for efficiency reasons.
Then nφ = deg(φ) must be very small; and since ∆(φ) must be negative, t
2
φ
(and hence |∆(φ)|) must also be very small. In particular, |tφ| < 2
√
deg(φ)
and |∆(φ)| < 4 deg(φ).
In practice, Z[φ] is either the maximal order in Q(π), or (exceptionally)
an order of index two in the maximal order. It is therefore reasonable to
assume Z[π] is contained in Z[φ],
so
π = cφ+ b with b = 12 (tπ − ctφ) and c2∆(φ) = t2π − 4q .
This allows us to write down a basis for (a sublattice of) the GLV lattice
using Theorem 2.
It is important to note that in practice, b and c are already known from
the determination of the curve order, precisely because π = cφ+ b. Indeed,
if we want to compute the order of an elliptic curve known to have complex
multiplication by a CM order (such as Z[φ], in this case), then we would
typically use the algorithm described in [25, §4], which computes the trace
tπ of Frobenius by computing b and c. This approach uses Cornacchia’s
algorithm to compute a generator of a principal ideal in Z[φ] of norm q,
before taking its trace to compute #E(Fq); but this generator is none other
than π = cφ+ b.
Alternatively, E could be constructed using the CM method starting
from the small discriminant ∆(φ). In this case, b and c are explicitly con-
structed so that cφ+ b will have norm q.
In any case, if we had somehow mislaid the values of b and c, then we
could recover them by factoring the ideal (q) in Z[φ] using (for example)
Cornacchia’s algorithm, which amounts to repeating the point counting al-
gorithm described above. The element cφ + b will be (up to sign) one of
the two resulting generators of the factors of (q). Alternatively, we could
use c ≡ (2− tπ)/(2λφ − tφ) (mod N); though inverting 2λφ − tφ modulo N
is roughly equivalent to the use of the Euclidean algorithm in the original
GLV method.
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One important feature of the GLV setting is that tφ, nφ, and ∆(φ) are
independent of q and tπ, so the bitlength of the basis produced by Theo-
rem 2 exceeds 12 log2 q by no more than an explicit constant. The following
examples consider the new basis for the GLV curves with endomorphisms
of degree at most 3 (treated in detail elsewhere by Gallant, Lambert, and
Vanstone [10] and Longa and Sica [19]).
Example 1 (j-invariant 1728: cf. [10, Ex. 3] and [19, Ex. 1]). If q ≡ 3
(mod 4), then for every a 6= 0 in Fq the curve E1728 : y2 = x3+ax has an Fq-
endomorphism φ : (x, y) 7→ (−x,−iy) (where i2 = −1), with Pφ(T ) = T 2+1;
so Z[φ] ∼= Z[√−1]. Theorem 2 constructs the basis
b1 =
(
1
2tπ − 1, c
)
and b2 =
(
c, 1− 12tπ
)
,
where c2 = q − (tπ/2)2. This basis is not only short (clearly ‖b1‖∞ =
‖b2‖∞ ≤ 12 log2 q) and reduced, it is also orthogonal.
Example 2 (j-invariant 0: cf.[10, Ex. 4] and [19, Ex. 2]). If q ≡ 2
(mod 3), then for any a 6= 0 in Fq, the curve E1728 : y2 = x3 + a has
an Fq-endomorphism φ : (x, y) 7→ (ζ3x, y) (where ζ3 is a primitive third
root of unity), with Pφ(T ) = T
2 + T + 1: that is, E0 has explicit CM by
Z[(1 +
√−3)/2]. Looking at the basis produced by Theorem 2, we find
b1 =
(
1
2(tπ − c)− 1, c
)
and b2 =
(
1
2(tπ + c)− 1, 1 − 12(tπ − c)
)
,
where c2 = 13
(
4q − t2π
)
. We note that in this case, two applications of the
triangle inequality yields log2 ‖bi‖∞ < 12 log2 q + 1.
Example 3 (j-invariant −3375: cf. [10, Ex. 5] and [19, Ex. 3]). Suppose
−7 is a square in Fq. The curve E−3375 : y2 = x3− 34x2− 2x− 1 over Fq has
a degree-2 endomorphism φ with Pφ(T ) = T
2−T +2 (and ker φ = 〈(2, 0)〉);
that is, E−3375 has explicit CM by Z[(−1 +
√−7)/2]. Theorem 2 yields
vectors
b1 = (b− 1, c) and b2 = (2c− (b− 1), (1 − b)) ;
as before, log2 ‖bi‖∞ < 12 log2 q + 1.
Example 4 (j-invariant 8000: cf. [10, Ex. 6] and [19, Ex. 4]). Suppose
−2 is a square in Fq. The curve E8000 : y2 = 4x3 − 30x − 28 over Fq has
a degree-2 endomorphism φ with Pφ(T ) = T
2 + 2 (and ker φ = 〈(−2, 0)〉):
that is, E8000 has explicit CM by Z[
√−2]. Theorem 2 yields vectors
b1 = (b− 1, c) and b2 = (2c, 1 − b)
with log2 ‖bi‖ ≤ 12 log2 q + 1.
Example 5 (j-invariant 32768: cf. [19, Ex. 5]). Suppose −11 is a square
in Fq. The curve E32768 : y2 = x3 − 13824539 x + 27648539 over Fq has a degree 3
endomorphism φ with Pφ(T ) = T
2 − T + 3: that is, E32768 has explicit CM
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by Z[12(1 +
√−11)]. The kernel of φ is cut out by (x − 247 (1 − 1/
√−11)).
Theorem 2 constructs a pair of vectors
b1 = (b− 1, c) and b2 = (3c− (b− 1), 1 − b)
with log2 ‖bi‖∞ < 12 log2 q + 2.
Example 6 (j-invariant 54000: cf. [19, Example 6]). Suppose −3 is a
square in Fq. The curve E54000 : y2 = x3 − 3375121 x + 6750121 over Fq has an Fq-
endomorphism φ of degree 3 with minimal polynomial Pφ(T ) = T
2+3 (and
kernel cut out by (x − 45/11)): that is, E54000 has explicit CM by Z[
√−3].
Theorem 2 yields vectors
b1 = (b− 1, c) and b2 = (3c, 1 − b)
with log2 ‖bi‖∞ < 12 log2 q + 1.
6. Decompositions for the GLS endomorphism
Let E0 be an ordinary elliptic curve over Fp, and let E := E0 × Fp2
be the base extension of E0 to Fp2 . The Frobenius endomorphism π0 of
E0 has characteristic polynomial Pπ(T ) = T 2 − t0T + p with |t0| < 2√p,
while the (p2-power) Frobenius endomorphism π of E satisfies π = π20 , so
Pπ(T ) = T
2 − (t20 − 2p)T + p2. In particular,
#E(Fp2) = Pπ(1) = (p + 1)2 − t20 = #E0(Fp) · (p + 1 + t0),
so #E(Fp2) cannot have prime divisors larger than O(p).
Now let E ′ be the quadratic twist of E , with τ : E → E ′ the twisting
isomorphism. The Frobenius π′ on E ′ satisfies π′ = τπτ−1, so
Pπ′(T ) = T
2 − (2p − t20)T + p2 and ∆π′ = t20(t20 − 4p) .
Note that #E ′(Fq) = Pπ′(1) = (p − 1)2 + t20; unlike #E(Fq), this can take
prime (and near-prime) values, so E ′ may be useful for discrete-logarithm-
based cryptosystems.
The GLS endomorphism on E ′ is ψ := τπ0τ−1. It is defined over Fp2 ; its
minimal polynomial is
Pψ(T ) = Pπ0(T ) = T
2 − t0T + p , and ∆ψ = t20 − 4p .
If G is a cyclic subgroup of E ′(Fp2) of order N such that ψ(G) ⊆ G, then the
eigenvalue λψ of ψ on G is a square root of −1 modulo N .
We have ψ2 = τπ20τ
−1 = τπτ−1 = −π′, so Z[ψ] contains Z[π′]. We can
therefore apply Theorem 2 to the inclusion Z[π′] ⊆ Z[ψ] in order to compute
a short basis for (a sublattice of) L = 〈(N, 0), (−λψ , 1)〉.
Looking at the discriminants, we see that Z[π′] has conductor |t0| in
Z[ψ]. Indeed,
π′ = −t0ψ + p ;
so Theorem 2 yields a basis
b1 = (p− 1,−t0) and b2 = (−t0, 1− p) .
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This is precisely (up to sign) the basis of [9, Lemma 3]; it is not only short
(the largest coefficient is p−1, so log2 ‖bi‖∞ < log2 p), it is also orthogonal.
If E ′(Fp2) does not have prime order, then we can easily shrink the basis to
fit G by following the procedure described in §4.
Remark 3. From a purely formal point of view, we could have treated
this identically to the GLV case, with ψ in place of φ, but there are a
number of important differences. First of all, the ring Z[ψ] has a much
larger discriminant than any GLV order: in general Z[ψ] is far from being
the maximal order of the endomorphism algebra. Second, the parameters
tψ, nψ, and ∆(ψ) vary with p and t, so we cannot treat the excess bitlength
in the Ciet–Sica–Quisquater bounds (Ineq. (5)) as a constant. Indeed, if we
simply plug the values
q = p2 , tπ = 2p − t20 , ∆(π) = t20(t20 − 4p) ,
nψ = p , tψ = t0 , ∆(ψ) = t
2
0 − 4p
into Inequalities (4) or (5), or even the “optimal” bound of [6, Theorem 4],
then we obtain a rather pessimistic bitlength bound of around 34 log2 q, which
exceeds the true length of the basis by 14 log2 q bits.
7. Decompositions for reductions of Q-curves
GLS curves may be seen as a special case of a more general construction
involving reductions of quadratic Q-curves. We give a very brief description
of this construction here (see [26] for more details, and families of examples).
In [26, Proposition 2], a basis is constructed in a seemingly ad-hoc way that
yields half-length scalar decompositions; we will see below that this basis
also results from Theorem 2.
Let K be a quadratic field, σ the nontrivial automorphism of K fixing Q.
Let E˜ : y2 = x3+ ax+ b and σE˜ : y2 = x3+σ(a)x+σ(b) be a pair of Galois-
conjugate curves over K such that there exists an isogeny φ˜ : E → (p)E of
small degree d defined over K(
√−d). If p is an inert prime in K that is
a prime of good reduction for E˜ (and not dividing d), then we can reduce
φ˜ : E˜ → σE˜ modulo p to obtain a d-isogeny φ : E → (p)E of curves over
Fp2. Here
(p)E , the reduction of σE modulo p, is the curve formed from
E by applying p-th powering to its coefficients; so there also exists a p-th
power Frobenius isogeny π0 :
(p)E → E . Composing φ with π0, we obtain an
inseparable endomorphism ψ := π0φ of E , of degree dp. If d is very small,
then ψ can be efficiently computable, since p-th powering in Fp2 is essentially
free. (The GLS construction is equivalent to the special case where φ is an
isomorphism—that is, d = 1.)
Let ǫp := −
(
−d
p
)
; that is, ǫp = 1 if −d is a nonsquare modulo p, and
−1 if it is a square. Then according to [26, Proposition 1], the minimal
polynomial of ψ is
Pψ(T ) = T
2 − ǫprdT + dp ,
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and
dr2 = 2p+ ǫptπ .
(This determines r up to sign; exchanging r with −r corresponds to exchang-
ing φ with −φ.) Squaring the endomorphism, we obtain ψ2 = π0φπ0φ =
ǫpπ0φφ
†π0 = ǫp[d]π, where π is the usual p
2-power Frobenius on E . In
particular, Z[π] is contained in Z[ψ]; we find that
π = rψ − ǫpp .
If G ⊆ E(Fq) is a cyclic subgroup of order N such that ψ(G) = G, then the
eigenvalue of ψ on G is a square root of ǫpd modulo N .
Applying Theorem 2 to the orders Z[π] ⊆ Z[ψ], we obtain the basis
b1 = (−(1 + ǫpp), r) and b2 = (−ǫprd, 1 + ǫpp) .
Up to sign, this is the basis appearing in the proof of [26, Proposition 2],
where it is used to produce scalar decompositions having bitlength at most
⌈log2 p⌉. While this basis generates a sublattice of determinant #E(Fp2),
if N 6= #E(Fp2) then the basis may be easily shrunk to fit G following the
procedure outlined in §4.
8. Four-dimensional decompositions for GLV+GLS
Recently, Longa and Sica [19] followed by Guillevic and Ionica [12] have
proposed using a pair of efficiently computable endomorphisms φ and ψ to
construct four-dimensional scalar decompositions on elliptic curves, corre-
sponding to the situation of §1 with (φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4) = (1, φ, ψ, φψ). (The
Longa–Sica technique supersedes the earlier 3-dimensional construction of
Zhou, Hu, Xu, and Song [32] with (φ1, φ2, φ3) = (1, φ, ψ), which we will not
cover here.) Longa and Sica propose an elaborate iterated Cornacchia algo-
rithm to derive their lattice basis. In this section, we show that no lattice
algorithms are necessary: we can generate four short lattice vectors using
Lemma 1.
Recall the Longa–Sica construction: Let E0/Fp be a GLV curve, with an
efficiently computable endomorphism φ0, and Frobenius π0. Applying the
GLS construction (exactly as in §6) to E0, we obtain a twisted elliptic curve
E ′ over Fp2 with an efficiently computable endomorphism ψ corresponding
to the twist of π0: if τ : E0 ⊗ Fp2 → E ′ is the twisting isomorphism, then
ψ = τπ0τ
−1. The endomorphisms ψ and π′ satisfy
Pψ(T ) = Pπ0(T ) = T
2 − tπ0T + p and Pπ′(T ) = T 2 − (2p − t2π0)T + p2,
respectively. Clearly, Z[ψ] contains Z[π′]: the discriminants of the orders
Z[π′] and Z[ψ] are
∆(ψ) = t2π0 − 4p and ∆(π′) = t2π0(t2π0 − 4p) = t2π0∆(ψ) ,
so the relative conductor of Z[π′] in Z[ψ] is |tπ0 | < 2
√
p. As in vanilla GLS,
we can write
π′ = −tπ0ψ + p .
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The GLV endomorphism φ0 on E0 induces a second efficient endomor-
phism φ := τφ0τ
−1 on E ′. We have Pφ = Pφ0 , so Z[φ] ∼= Z[φ0]. Since φ0 is a
GLV endomorphism, Z[φ] is either the maximal order of the endomorphism
algebra of E ′, or very close to it—so it makes sense to assume that Z[φ]
contains Z[ψ] (cf. Remark 5 below), so that we can write ψ as
ψ = cφ+ b ,
where
(6) b =
1
2
(tπ0 − ctφ) and c2 =
∆ψ
∆φ
=
t2π0 − 4p
t2φ − 4nφ
.
Observe that b and c are both in O(
√
p). As with conventional GLV
curves, c and b are both already known as byproducts of the curve con-
struction (via the CM method) or its order computation: if π0 = c0φ0 + b0,
then
c =
c0
t0
and b =
1
t0
(b0 − p) .
Theorem 4. With φ and ψ defined as above, suppose we are in the
situation of §1 with (φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4) = (1, φ, ψ, φψ). The vectors
b1 = (1, 0, b, c) , b2 = (0, 1,−cnφ, ctφ + b) ,
b3 = (−b,−c, 1, 0) , b4 = (cnφ,−ctφ − b, 0, 1)
generate a sublattice of determinant #E(Fq) in L. If G = E(Fq), then L =
〈b1,b2,b3,b4〉.
Proof. Let λφ and λψ be the eigenvalues of φ and ψ on G, respectively.
Applying Lemma 1 to the inclusion Z[ψ] ⊂ Z[φ], we obtain relations
λψ − cλφ − b ≡ 0 (mod N) and
λψλφ − tφλψ − bλφ + cnφ + btφ ≡ 0 (mod N) ,
corresponding to the vectors b3 and (cnφ + btφ,−c,−tφ, 1) = b4 − tφb3.
Multiplying the relations above through by −λψ and using λ2ψ = λψ2 = −1
(mod N), we obtain new relations
1 + cλφλψ + bλψ ≡ 0 (mod N) and
λφ − tφ + bλφλψ − (cnφ + btφ)λψ ≡ 0 (mod N) ,
corresponding to the vectors (1, 0, b, c) = b1 and (−tφ, 1,−cnφ − btφ,−b) =
b4 − tφb3, respectively. 
The vectors produced by Theorem 4 are short: φ is a GLV endomor-
phism, so both nφ and tφ are in O(1). Hence, in view of Eq. (6), ‖bi‖∞ is
in O(
√
p) for 1 ≤ i ≤ 4.
Remark 5. The assumption that Z[ψ] is contained in Z[φ] is incompat-
ible with the hypothesis of [19] (which supposes that Q(φ)∩Q(ψ) = Q); but
even without this assumption, Q(φ) = Q(ψ) = Q(π′) when E is ordinary, so
the hypothesis of [19] is never satisfied for ordinary curves.
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9. Decompositions for the Guillevic–Ionica construction
The Guillevic–Ionica construction [12] uses a modified CM method to
search for elliptic curves E/Fp2 such that E has endomorphisms φ and ψ such
that φ is separable of very small degree d1, and ψ is the composition of an
inseparable p-isogeny and a separable isogeny of very small degree d2. (In a
sense, these curves are to Longa–Sica curves what reductions of Q-curves are
to GLS curves.) Once such E and p have been found (given d1 and d2), the
φ and ψ are easily recovered using Ve´lu’s formulæ [31]. If this construction
is used, then (as with the standard CM method) the expression of π as an
element of Z[φ] is known:
π = cφ+ b .
Theorem 6. With φ and ψ defined as above: Suppose we are in the
situation of §1 with (φ1, φ2, φ3, φ4) = (1, φ, ψ, φψ), and ψ2 = [±d]π. The
vectors
b1 = (±d, 0,−b,−c) , b2 = (0,±d, cnφ,−ctφ − b) ,
b3 = (−b,−c, 1, 0) , b4 = (cnφ,−ctφ − b, 0, 1)
generate a sublattice of determinant #E(Fp2) in L. If G = E(Fp2), then
L = 〈b1,b2,b3,b4〉.
Proof. The proof is the same as for Theorem 4, but with λ2ψ = ±d. 
10. Two-dimensional decompositions in genus 2
SupposeA/Fq is an ordinary principally polarized abelian surface (in our
applications, A is either the Jacobian of a genus 2 curve, or the Weil restric-
tion of an elliptic curve). The Frobenius endomorphism π of A generates a
quartic CM field Q(π), and the Rosati involution of End(A) (exchanging an
endomorphism with its Rosati dual) acts as complex conjugation on Q(π).
Hence, the quadratic real subfield of Q(π) is Q(π + π†), and Z[π + π†] is a
real quadratic order. We may identify π† with q/π; the eigenvalue of π+ π†
on subgroups of A(Fq) is 1 + q (because π has eigenvalue 1).
The characteristic polynomial of Frobenius is
Pπ(T ) = T
4 − t(π+π†)T 3 + (2q + n(π+π†))T 2 − t(π+π†)T + q2 ,
so
(7) #A(Fq) = Pπ(1) = Pπ+π†(q+1) = (q +1)2 − t(π+π†)(q+1)+ n(π+π†) .
The Weil bounds yield
|t(π+π†)| ≤ 4
√
q and |n(π+π†)| ≤ 4q ,
while Ru¨ck [24] shows that
t2(π+π†) − 4n(π+π†) > 0 and n(π+π†) + 4q > 2|t(π+π†)|
√
q .
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Theorem 7. Suppose φ is a non-integer real multiplication endomor-
phism of an ordinary abelian surface A (ie, φ† = φ) such that Z[π + π†] ⊆
Z[φ], and assume that we are in the situation of §1 with (φ1, φ2) = (1, φ). If
π + π† = cφ+ b, then the vectors
b1 = (q + 1− b,−c) and b2 = (cnφ − (q + 1− b)tφ, q + 1− b)
generate a sublattice of determinant #A(Fq) in L. If G = A(Fq), then
L = 〈b1,b2〉.
Proof. The proof is almost exactly the same as that of Theorem 2. As
we noted above, (π + π†) has eigenvalue q + 1 on G. Applying Lemma 1 to
Z[π + π†] ⊂ Z[φ], we obtain relations
(q + 1− b) · 1− c · λφ ≡ 0 (mod N) and
(cnφ − (q + 1− b)tφ) · 1 + (q + 1− b) · λφ ≡ 0 (mod N) .
The first implies that b1 is in L, the second that b2 is in L. The determinant
of 〈b1,b2〉 is
(q + 1− b)2 + c2nφ − (q + 1− b)ctφ = #A(Fq) ,
using Eq. (7), t(π+π†) = ctφ + 2b, and t
2
φ − 4nφ = c2(t2(π+π†) − 4n(π+π†)). 
We apply Theorem 7 to the explicit real multiplication families treated
in [28, 17, 11]. In each case, the assumption Z[π + π†] ⊆ Z[φ] is fulfilled
because Z[φ] is the maximal order of the real subfield of the endomorphism
algebra.
Example 7 (Explicit RM by Q(
√
5)). Brumer [4], Hashimoto [13],
Mestre [20], and Tautz, Top, and Verberkmoes [29] have given explicit
constructions of families of genus 2 curves whose Jacobians have explicit
real multiplication by Z[(1 +
√
5)/2], which is the maximal order of Q(
√
5)
(see Wilson’s thesis [30] for a full characterization of all such curves). In
each case, the curve is equipped with a correspondence inducing an explicit
endomorphism φ on the Jacobian satisfying Pφ(T ) = T
2 + T − 1; these
endomorphisms have been exploited for fast scalar multiplication in [17]
and [28].
Let C/Fq be the reduction mod p of a curve taken from one of these
families; then JC inherits the explicit endomorphism φ, and Z[φ] ∼= Z[(1 +√
5)/2]. Since Z[(1 +
√
5)/2] is the maximal order of Q(
√
5), we must have
Z[π + π†] ⊆ Z[φ]; so
π + π† = cφ+ b
where b = 12(t(π+π†) + c) and 5c
2 = ∆(π + π†).
Putting ourselves in the situation of §1 with (φ1, φ2) = (1, φ), Theorem 7
yields vectors
b1 = (q + 1− b,−c) and b2 = (−c− (q + 1− b), q + 1− b)
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in L. Note that |c| < 4
√
q/5, so |b| < (2 + 2/√5)√q, and
σ(b1) = σ(b2) = log2(q + 1).
Example 8. Mestre [21] has constructed a two-parameter family of
genus 2 curves whose Jacobians have explicit real multiplication by Z[
√
2]
(an alternative presentation of these curves for cryptographic applications is
developed in [11]; see Bending’s thesis [2] for a full characterization of curves
with RM by Z[
√
2]). The efficient endomorphism φ satisfies Pφ(T ) = T
2− 2
in this case, so ∆(φ) = 8.
Let C/Fq be the reduction mod p of a curve taken from one of these
families; JC inherits the explicit endomorphism φ, and Z[φ] ∼= Z[
√
2]. Since
Z[
√
2] is the maximal order of Q(
√
2), we must have Z[π + π†] ⊆ Z[φ]; so
π + π† = cφ+ b
where b = 12(t(π+π†) + c) and 2c
2 = ∆(π + π†).
Putting ourselves in the situation of §1 with (φ1, φ2) = (1, φ), Theorem 7
yields vectors
b1 = (q + 1− b,−c) and b2 = (−2c, q + 1− b)
in L. For this family, |c| < 2
√
q/2 and |b| < (2 + 1/2√2)√q; each is much
smaller than q + 1, so as before we have
σ(b1) = σ(b2) = log2(q + 1).
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